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Abstract: This paper provides empirical confirmation for Petersen and Rajan’s (2002) widely accepted 
conjecture that information technology was the primary driver of the observed increase in small business 
borrower-lender distances in the United States in recent years. Using a different data source for small 
business loans, we show that annual increases in borrower-lender distances were slow and steady prior to 
1993 (the end point in Petersen and Rajan’s data) but accelerated rapidly after that. Importantly, we are 
able to assign at least half of this acceleration to the adoption of credit scoring technologies by the lending 
banks. Our tests also reveal strong statistical associations between lending distances and borrower 
characteristics, lender characteristics, market conditions, regulatory constraints, moral hazard incentives, 
and principal-agent incentives. 
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The Information Revolution and Small Business Lending: The Missing Evidence  
 
In one of the more widely cited papers in the recent finance literature, Petersen and Rajan (2002) 
document small, but systematic, increases in the geographic distances between small businesses and their 
bank lenders between 1973 and 1993.  The authors primarily attribute this increase in borrower-lender 
distances to the greater use of information technology by lenders, empirically rejecting other potential 
causal factors such as banking industry consolidation and changes in the distribution of borrower 
locations over time.  They conclude that better, cheaper, and faster access to information, which includes 
but is not limited to hard information about borrower creditworthiness, allows banks to lend to 
increasingly more distant firms without compromising their ability to successfully underwrite these 
credits, monitor the borrowers, and intervene when necessary.  This conclusion has become a stylized fact 
in the financial economics literature and has motivated numerous studies of the impact of increasing 
distance on credit access, loan pricing, and loan and lender performance (see, e.g., Degryse and Ongena 
(2005); Agarwal and Hauswald (2006); Berger and DeYoung (2006); Brevoort and Hannan (2006); and 
DeYoung, Glennon, and Nigro (2008)).   
Notably, Petersen and Rajan (2002) draw their key inference mainly from indirect evidence, 
which contains neither the application of information technology nor differences in lending production 
functions over time or across banks.  Instead, the authors merely show that: (i) borrower-lender distance 
continued to increase over time after conditioning on other factors, and (ii) the ratio of bank employment-
to-bank lending declined between 1973 and 1993, consistent with the substitution of hard information 
technology inputs for labor-related soft information inputs.  Moreover, their database largely pre-dates the 
implementation of credit scoring models for small business lending (Akhavein, Frame, and White 2005), 
a strategically transcendent information technology that has transformed the retail banking production 
process.    1
In the absence of direct observable evidence, the inference drawn by Petersen and Rajan (2002) 
about the drivers of borrower-lender distances is an impressive accomplishment.  Nonetheless, it is 
important to demonstrate whether, and to what degree, the inference is correct.  We are not aware of any 
study that has either confirmed or refuted the Petersen and Rajan conjecture based on the observable 
application of information technology to small business lending.  In this short paper, we establish a strong 
empirical link between small business credit scoring and borrower-lender distance for a sample of 31,880 
Small Business Administration (SBA) loans originated between 1984 and 2001.  During the first portion 
of our database, which overlaps the final ten years of the Peterson and Rajan data, we find small but 
steady annual increases in borrower-lender distances that are very similar to the pattern documented by 
those authors.  But the second portion of our database—which extends beyond their data and coincides 
with the adoption of small business credit scoring methods by many large U.S. banking companies—
yields quantitatively different patterns.  We find a dramatic acceleration in small business borrower-
lender distance well beyond that documented by Petersen and Rajan, and that the increases in lending 
distance were substantially larger for loans written by credit-scoring banking companies.  Thus, we 
provide the direct link between information technology and increased lending distances that is absent 
from the original study.  Moreover, by combining our results with those of Petersen and Rajan we are able 
to document a three decade-long expansion in small business borrower-lender distances, which begins 
with increased lender reach within local markets and ends with the near-complete erosion of geographic 
boundaries.   
We first establish these findings simply and starkly using a graphical analysis, and we then 
confirm the findings by estimating controlled multivariate regressions.  In addition to establishing point 
estimates for the impact of credit scoring on lending distance, the regression analysis yields a number of 
important and interesting ancillary results.  We show that small business borrower-lender distance is 
associated in reasonable ways with borrower characteristics, lender characteristics, market conditions, 
regulatory constraints, moral hazard incentives (lender exploitation of government guarantees), and 
principal-agent incentives (borrower exploitation of corporate limited liability).  After controlling for   2
these influences, we are able to assign at least half of the post-1993 (i.e., post-Petersen and Rajan data) 
acceleration in borrower-lender distances to the adoption of small business credit scoring technologies by 
the lending banks. 
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 1 describes our two main databases: a random sample of 
loans from the SBA’s flagship 7(a) program and the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta’s database on U.S. 
commercial bank adoption of small business credit scoring methods.  Section 2 analyzes these data at the 
aggregate level, by comparing the annual trend in average borrower-lender distance to the time series of 
distance data reported by Petersen and Rajan (2002).  Section 3 analyzes the loan-level data by estimating 
a variety of multivariate regressions.  Section 4 concludes the study.    
 
1. The Data 
Petersen and Rajan (2002) extracted borrower-lender distances from the Federal Reserve’s 1993 
National Survey of Small Business Finances (NSSBF).  By observing in what year the small businesses 
included in the survey had first borrowed from their current (i.e., 1993) lender, the authors were able to 
show that borrower-lender distances at origination had been increasing during the preceding 20 years.  In 
contrast, we directly observe borrower-lender distances for Small Business Administration (SBA) loans 
originated in each year from 1984 through 2001.  The NSSBF data sample the population of all small 
firms (fewer than 500 employees) while the small firms in our sample are all to some extent credit-
constrained borrowers as defined by the SBA—nevertheless, the two samples yield very similar 
borrower-lender distances during the years in which they overlap, as shown below.
1 
The SBA’s 7(a) loan program provides loan guarantees to eligible businesses through qualified 
financial institutions (mainly, but not exclusively commercial banks).  Lenders select the firms to receive 
                                                           
1 The NSSBF does not identify which of its firms participate in SBA loan guarantees; logically, the two samples 
must overlap because the NSSBF draws its sample from the entire population of U.S. small businesses, a large 
portion of which have SBA-guaranteed loans.  As a rough approximation of this overlap, we note that in 1999 the 
total dollar value of small business loans under $250,000 in the U.S. was $195 billion, while the combined managed 
SBA guaranteed loan portfolio in 1999 (mostly loans under $250,000) was just over $40 billion, or roughly 20 
percent of the total (Office of Advocacy, 1999).   3
loans, initiate SBA involvement, underwrite the loans within SBA program guidelines, and monitor and 
report back to the SBA the progress of these loans.  To qualify for an SBA loan guarantee, a small 
business borrower must be unable to access the same credit on reasonable terms from non-federally 
guaranteed sources.  If this rule was strictly enforced, then the typical SBA borrower would be relatively 
more credit-constrained than the typical NSSBF borrower, although in practice the lending bank has 
substantial discretion in interpreting this language and including the loan in the SBA program (e.g., 
Temkin and Theodos 2008).  The SBA guarantee is a pro rata loss sharing arrangement between the SBA 
and the lender; in the event of a default, the SBA absorbs a fraction of each dollar of loss with the lending 
bank exposed to the balance.
2   
For purposes of comparison across databases, it is important to ask whether government 
guarantees alter the risk-return proposition in SBA loans so much that borrower-lender distance is 
appreciably less constrained by a lender's ability to observe credit risk.  We believe that this is unlikely.  
First, the SBA guarantee gives lenders a put option that covers only a fraction of  any loan losses; so long 
as SBA lenders incur some non-trivial share of potential loan default costs, they face the same qualitative 
tradeoffs between risk and return as do non-subsidized lenders.  Second, the SBA put option simply 
reduces risk in a manner that is qualitatively similar to credit risk hedging techniques used by issuers of 
non-subsidized loans (e.g., portfolio diversification, credit derivatives).  Third, geographic distance 
confers information-gathering frictions (e.g., increased travel costs, less frequent in-person contact), 
which are independent of borrower risk, on both subsidized and non-subsidized lenders.   
Unlike Petersen and Rajan (2002), we are able to observe the implementation of a specific 
information technology used by banks during our sample period: small business credit-scoring.
3  In a 
telephone survey conducted in January 1998, researchers at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta queried 
                                                           
2 The guarantee percentage represents the pro rata share of the unpaid principal balance and accrued interest up to 
60 days that will be covered by the SBA in the event that a borrower defaults on their obligation.  Hence, the loss-
sharing arrangement between the lender and the SBA does not include a first-loss position (i.e., it is not a senior-
subordinate structure).   
3 On pages 2552-2553 Petersen and Rajan state: “…we have been able to characterize the changing environment in 
which small firms and their lenders operate.  We have not directly identified the source of this change…”    4
the lead (largest) bank in each of the 200 largest U.S. bank holding companies on whether and how they 
used small business credit scoring (SBCS).  Of the banks that responded, 63% reported that they were 
using SBCS as of or prior to the survey date.
4  Frame, Srinivasan, and Woosley (2001) provide a 
complete discussion of the survey questions and results.   
We capture the technology adoption decision with the dummy variable SCORER, which equals 
one for any bank affiliated with surveyed banking companies that used SBCS during the year in question, 
and is loan size-adjusted based on information in the Federal Reserve survey.
5  We make the reasonable 
assumption that this underwriting technology passed freely from the lead banks queried in the survey to 
their affiliated banks.  Because only half (99 of 200) of the banking companies contacted responded to the 
Federal Reserve survey, we exclude from our data all loans from banks affiliated with the non-responders.  
Because we do not know with certainty whether “scoring banks” credit-scored all, or just a portion, of 
their small business loan applications (although the authors of the survey lean toward the former), we 
state our credit-scoring hypothesis carefully: We test whether banks that use credit scoring models have 
different distance patterns, not whether credit-scored loans have different distance patterns.  We are not 
concerned that the survey included only the lead banks of the largest 200 U.S. banking organizations, 
because small business credit scoring was almost exclusively a large bank activity prior to 1999 (Frame, 
Srinivasan, and Woosley, 2001).  We also are not concerned that our SBA loan data extends three years 
beyond the survey date; the distance-technology patterns in the raw data are fully apparent well before 
1998. 
Our SBA loan data represent a 20% random annual sample of the small business loans originated 
each year from 1984 through 2001 by U.S. commercial banks under the 7(a) loan program.  The sample 
contains 31,880 small business loans made by 5,497 banks.  Due to the growth in the loan program over 
                                                           
4 Because the earliest known adoption of SBCS by a bank was in 1992 (Akhavein, Frame, and White 2005), the 
1973-1993 Peterson and Rajan database for all intents and purposes precedes this innovation.  However, the authors 
presaged the rapidity of its future adoption: “Conversations with industry experts and evidence in recent studies 
suggests that, if anything, the trend has accelerated since 1993 (page 2534).”     
5 The survey asked banks whether they used SBCS for all small business loan applications or only for some loan 
sizes (i.e., loans less than $100,000; loans between $100,000 and $250,000; or loans between $250,000 and $1 
million).  We use this information to code each lender’s SCORER value appropriately for the different size SBA 
loans that are made.   5
time, our sample is weighted toward more recent years; 1995 has the most loans with 4,436 and 1985 has 
the least loans with 574.  The SBA data identifies the bank lender (including the branch location where 
the loan was made) and this allows us to merge the SBA loan data with lender financial statements 
(Federal Reserve Y-9Cs, FDIC Call Reports) as well as with the Atlanta Federal Reserve credit scoring 
information.  The SBA data also identify the location of the small business borrower and this allows us to 
merge the SBA loan data with local market structure data (FDIC Summary of Deposits) as well as with 
state-level macroeconomic data.  Descriptive statistics for all of the variables derived from these data are 
displayed in Table 1 and described in detail below in Section 3.    
 
2. Univariate Trends in Small Business Borrower-Lender Distance 
With both borrower location and lender location in-hand, we calculate the straight-line (as the 
crow flies) geographic distance (DISTANCE) between the borrower and the bank office at which the loan 
was written.  We plot the annual median values of DISTANCE for each year of our 1984–2001 data in 
Figure 1.  These data are taken from DeYoung, Glennon and Nigro (2008, Table 1).  We also plot the 
multi-year medians of borrower-lender distances for the 1973–79, 1980–89, and 1990–93 time periods 
reported by Petersen and Rajan (2002, Table I).   
During the overlapping 1984-1993 time window, both these time series exhibit relatively short 
borrower-lender distances that increase gradually over time.
6  These similarities lend support to the 
backward-looking method used by Petersen and Rajan (2002) to measure the secular trend in borrower-
lender distance.  The similarities also show that our SBA data (distance at the time of loan origination) are 
capturing the same technological evolution in loan underwriting and monitoring found by Petersen and 
Rajan in the NSSBF data.  
                                                           
6 Although the two time trends are very similar, there is a systematic and stable gap of 1½ to 2 miles between them.  
This gap may indicate a survivorship bias in the backward-looking methodology used by Petersen and Rajan, i.e., if 
small businesses located closer to their lenders were easier to evaluate and monitor, these lending relationships 
would be more likely to survive until 1993. The gap may also be caused by the partial SBA loan guarantee, which 
reduces (but does not eliminate) lender loss exposures, possibly inducing banks to lend to firms at longer distances.    6
The increasing trend in average borrower-lender distance accelerates in the post-1993 SBA data.  
Specifically, borrower-lender distance increases markedly for SBA loans made by affiliates of large 
banking companies that used credit-scoring models to evaluate small business loan applications (SCORER 
= 1); but continues its more gradual secular pace for the loans made by non-scoring banks and their 
affiliates (SCORER = 0).  This univariate analysis suggests that a specific technology—small business 
credit scoring—is the most important driver of the post-1993 increases in borrower-lender distance.   
However, non-trivial changes in information technology, risk management practices, banking industry 
regulation, and banking market competition also occurred after 1993 and may have contributed to or 
dampened the increase in borrower-lender distances.  We attempt to identify and disentangle these 
influences in the multivariate regression tests that follow.     
 
3. Multivariate Analysis  
  To obtain better measurements of these evolving distance phenomena, we estimate the 
DISTANCE-SCORER relationship in a controlled multivariate setting.  We model borrower-lender 
distance as a function of lending technology, lender characteristics, borrower characteristics, loan terms, 
and local market conditions.  The SBA loan originations in our data occurred over an 18 year time period 
(1984–2001), but we treat the data as a cross section.  All variables are observed in the year in which the 
loan was originated.  We use two different specifications to account for changes in scoring-related and 
non-scoring-related technological change over time.  The more flexible of the two specifications includes 
a vector of annual dummy variables (YEAR) on the right-hand side of the regression equation: 
lnDISTANCEi  =  α  +  β*SCORERi  +  γ*YEARi  
+ g(LENDERi; BORROWERi; LOANi; MARKETi)  +  εi                    (1) 
The second specification is less flexible but includes a pair of linear time trends (TIME1 and TIME2) and 
an interaction term (TIME2*SCORER) that allow us to estimate slopes for the various data trends 
displayed in Figure 1: 
lnDISTANCEi  =  α  +  β*SCORERi  +  γ1*TIME1 +  γ2*TIME2  +  γ3*TIME2*SCORERi   7
+ g(LENDERi; BORROWERi; LOANi; MARKETi)  +  εi                    (2) 
In both (1) and (2), i indexes individual loans originated during our sample period 1984–2001 and ε is a 
random error term assumed to be symmetric with the zero mean.   
We specify the dependent variable in natural logs because the distribution of DISTANCE is highly 
skewed by the increase in lending distances late in our sample period; for example, while the mean 
borrower-lender distance in our sample is almost 64 miles, the median borrower-lender distance is only 
nine miles.  (We add one mile to DISTANCE before taking the natural log.)  The main test variable 
SCORER is a dummy equal to one for lenders affiliated with organizations in which the lead bank 
identified itself as a “small business credit scorer” in the Atlanta Fed survey.  Some lenders reported that 
they credit scored only certain sized small business loan applications—e.g., loans under $100,000; 
between $100,000 and $250,000; between $250,000 and $1 million—and we adjust the SCORER variable 
accordingly for each lender.  YEAR is a vector of fixed-effect dummies based on the loan origination year 
(1984 is omitted).  TIME1 is a linear time trend over the entire 1984-2001 sample period (TIME1=0 in 
1984; =17 in 2001) and TIME2 is a linear time trend over the post-1993 portion of the sample period 
(TIME2=0 in 1984-1993; =8 in 2001).   
LENDER, BORROWER, LOAN and MARKET are vectors of control variables included to absorb 
the influence of lender characteristics, borrower characteristics, loan terms, and local market structure on 
borrower-lender distances.  We define the elements in each of these vectors below.  Although these 
variables are included chiefly as controls, we provide a brief analysis and discussion of their estimated 
coefficient values.  
3.1. Main Regression Results 
We estimate equations (1) and (2) using ordinary least squares techniques.  Statistical inference is 
performed using two different sets of robust standard errors, clustered alternatively on either the lending 
banks or on the geographic markets of the borrowers.
7  Full regression results are displayed in Table 2.  
                                                           
7 For urban borrowers, the local market is defined as the borrower’s Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA).  For 
borrowers located outside of MSAs, the local market is defined as the borrower’s state.     8
The estimated coefficients on the SCORER, YEAR and TIME variables are strongly consistent with the 
patterns displayed in Figure 1. 
Both regressions indicate that credit-scoring banks reached out substantially farther than non-
scoring banks to make small business loans.  Based on the equation (1) estimates, the average loan made 
by a scoring bank was 52.5 miles more distant than the average loan made by a non-scoring bank, ceteris 
paribus.  This result is derived as follows:  52.5 = exp[ln(42.3) + 0.8068] – 42.3, where 42.3 is the post-
1993 mean value of DISTANCE for non-scoring banks.  Based on the equation (2) estimates, scoring 
banks lent an average 29.7 miles farther than non-scoring banks, derived as follows:  29.7 = exp[ln(42.3) 
+ 0.5312] – 42.3, where 0.5312 = ∂lnDISTANCE/∂SCORER evaluated at the post-1993 mean value of 
TIME2 = 3.798.  Both of these point estimates are economically meaningful and statistically significant at 
the 1% level.   
Holding the effects of credit scoring constant, the estimated coefficients on the YEAR dummies in 
equation (1) indicate that statistically significant annual increases in borrower-lender distance began in 
the early-1990s and quickly became economically substantial.  For example, the coefficient on YEAR1994 
translates into an average 9.2 mile increase in mean borrower-lender distance between 1984 (the omitted 
year) and 1994.  This result is derived as follows: 9.2 = exp[ln(28.8) + 0.2764] – 28.8, where 28.8 is the 
mean value of DISTANCE for loans originated in 1984.  As we observed in Figure 1, the annual increases 
in borrower-lender distance accelerated during the 1990s; accordingly, performing a similar calculation 
based on the YEAR2001 coefficient yields an average 35.9 mile increase in borrower-lender distance over 
the entire sample period.  These substantial increases in distance are attributable to (a) non-credit scoring-
related technological advance and (b) the average effect of economic, regulatory, or industry phenomena 
that are not specified on the right-hand side of equation (1). 
The equation (2) specification allows us to separate the trends in borrower-lender distance into 
three distinct sources: the average trend in DISTANCE from 1984 through 2001 excluding the effects of 
post-1993 technological advance (TIME1); the additional post-1993 trend in DISTANCE associated with 
non-scoring-related technological advance (TIME2); and the additional post-1993 trend in DISTANCE   9
associated with credit scoring (TIME2*SCORER).  The annual increases in borrower-lender distance 
during our sample period are allocated relatively equally across these three sources.  Excluding the impact 
of post-1993 technological advances, borrower-lender distance increased by 3.36% per year on average 
during our 1984-2001 sample period.  This result might be interpreted as an extension of the slow 
increasing trend in borrower-lender distances identified by Petersen and Rajan (2002) for loans originated 
during 1973-1993.  For non-scoring banks, borrower-lender distance increased by an additional 2.40% per 
year during the post-1993 portion of our data, arguably the result of general (non-scoring-related) 
technological advances in lending.  For scoring banks, borrower-lender distance increased by an 
additional 3.01% per year (0.2194*0.1373, where the latter number is the mean value of SCORER in the 
data).  Hence, conservatively speaking, at least half of the dramatic acceleration in small business 
borrower-lender distances during the 1990s is attributable to the implementation of small business credit-
scoring.  
3.2.  Control Variable Results 
This section briefly defines the control variables included in (1) and (2) and the implications of 
their estimated coefficients.  All numerical interpretation of these coefficients are based on the results 
from regression (1) in Table 2. 
Lender Characteristics.  Banks better situated to manage the risk associated with business 
lending are more likely to lend to more distant small businesses.  DISTANCE is further for large banks 
(lnBANKSIZE), well-capitalized banks (EQUITYRATIO), banks that specialize in business lending 
(C&ILOANRATIO), and banks with SBA accreditation as “preferred loan providers” (PLP = 1).   
Sensibly,  DISTANCE tends to be smaller for more spatially concentrated banks—those that operate 
proportionately more bank branches (BRANCHES/ASSETS) or are part of a multi-bank holding company 
(MBHC = 1).  After controlling for bank size and organizational form, we find no evidence that the size of 
the bank holding company (lnBHCSIZE) influences lending distance.  We also find no evidence that the 
quality of a bank’s overall commercial loan portfolio (CIPASTDUERATIO) or certification as a “certified 
loan provider” (CLP = 1) are strong determinants of lnDISTANCE.   10
Borrower Characteristics.  Larger SBA borrowers (lnFIRMSIZE) tend to secure credit at lenders 
located relatively close by, although this effect is a small one: a 10% increase in firm size is associated 
with only a 0.4% decrease in distance.  Controlling for borrower size, young firms (NEWFIRM = 1) tend 
to be located farther away from their lenders on average, which supports the conventional notion that new 
businesses must search far and wide for credit.  Relative to small businesses organized as proprietorships 
(the omitted variable) or as partnerships, legally incorporated small businesses (CORPORATION = 1) 
tend to be located closer to their lenders; this result is consistent with lenders’ awareness of the potential 
agency problems associated with limited owner liability.  Agricultural, Fishery, and Forestry firms 
(SICCODE_A = 1) are located especially far from their bank lenders because, unlike other businesses 
located in rural areas, these firms cannot move their production processes into town.  Retail firms 
(SICCODE_G = 1) are typically located in shopping districts, with banking offices close by. 
Loan Characteristics.  The data indicate that lenders interpret both large government-guarantee 
coverage (GUAR%) and poor information about the borrower (LOWDOC = 1) as signals of risk: 
borrower-lender distances are shorter for loans with these characteristics.  However, lending distances are 
longer for loans that exhibit both of these characteristics (GUAR%*LOWDOC), which is consistent with 
lenders exploiting moral hazard incentives, i.e., shielding lenders from credit risk induces them to lend to 
more distant borrowers.  lnDISTANCE increases with the size of the loan (lnLOANSIZE), which indicates 
that borrowers that seek larger amounts of credit are willing to search farther.  Borrowers with 7-year 
loans (MATURITY7 = 1) are located somewhat farther away from their lenders than borrowers with 15-
year loans (the omitted maturity variable). 
Local Market Characteristics.  The spatial characteristics of local lending markets matter.   
lnDISTANCE is smaller when the borrower is located in a ZIP Code containing more bank branches 
(lnBRANCHZIP) and larger when the borrower is located in a state that imposed restrictions on bank 
branching at the time of the loan (BRANCHRESTRICT = 1).  Lending distances are longer in URBAN 
markets, consistent with a rural economic landscape that naturally places both small businesses and their 
potential lenders close together in small towns.  Controlling for these spatial characteristics, there is no   11
statistical relationship between lnDISTANCE and the concentration of commercial bank lenders (HHI = 
Hirschman-Herfindahl Index) in the local market.  Borrower-lender distances are larger for firms in 
economically vibrant markets (INCOMEGROWTH), which indicates that these markets can attract non-
local lenders.   
3.3. Additional Tests   
To test the robustness of our main findings, we also estimated equations (1) and (2) for 
subsamples of the data based on: the size of the small business loans (loans less than $100,000, loans 
between $100,000 and $250,000, and loans larger than $250,000); the size of the lending bank (bank 
assets less than or greater than $1 billion); and the time period in which the loan was originated (the first 
half of the sample, the second half of the sample, and the pre-1999 years).  All of the main results 
reported in Table 2 were robust in these subsample tests.  Using equation (1), the estimated SCORER 
coefficient ranged between 0.41 and 0.96 and was statistically significant in all of the subsample 
regressions.  The estimated YEAR coefficients continued to be statistically non-significant during the 
1980s and/or early 1990s, after which they became increasingly positive and statistically significant 
through 2001.  Using equation (2), the estimated SCORER coefficient ranged between -1.569 and -0.167 
and was generally significant, while the estimated TIME2*SCORER coefficient ranged between 0.1417 
and 0.5480 and was always statistically significant.  (Results are not shown here, but are available upon 
request.) 
All of our regression tests are based on the assumption that the lending technology that a bank 
uses to evaluate a small business loan application is exogenous to the distance of the applicant to the 
bank.  But it is potentially plausible that lending technology is endogenous to borrower-lender distance—
that is, banks that lend to more distant small businesses will be more likely to adopt small business credit 
scoring techniques in order to reduce the high cost of collecting information on these clients—and we 
performed a simple lender-level test to rule out this possibility.  First, we created the new variable called 
NEWSCORER which was equal to one in the year that a bank adopted small business credit scoring, and 
equal to zero in all other years and for all other banks.  Then, using the post-1993 data only (there was no   12
credit scoring reported prior to that year), we estimated a binary logit model in which a bank’s year t 
value of NEWSCORER is determined by the average value of DISTANCE for the loans it originated in 
year t-1.  The coefficient on lagged DISTANCE was negative and very small (-0.0002) with a p-value of 
0.089 for a sample size of 9,829 observations.  Thus, we reject the possibility that SCORER is 
endogenous to DISTANCE.    
 
4.  Conclusions 
The distances between small businesses and their bank lenders in the U.S. have been on the 
increase for several decades.  If technological advance has been the catalyst for these increases—as 
opposed to banking industry consolidation, say, which could lead to increased distances by reducing the 
number of lenders in any given geographic area—then the phenomenon indicates increased competition 
and greater supply of credit in local markets.  Improved information technology, when applied to credit 
underwriting and monitoring, allows small businesses to more credibly demonstrate their creditworthiness 
to lenders and permits out-of-market lenders to more effectively gauge and manage credit risk in more 
distant local markets.   
Petersen and Rajan (2002) observed marginal increases in small business borrower-lender 
distances during the 1980s and early 1990s, and were the first to infer from the data that these increases 
were made possible by new hard information technologies.  This inference has since become a stylized 
fact in the banking literature.  However, Petersen and Rajan did not directly quantify or analyze the 
implementation of information technology at these banks, but merely conjectured that this must be the 
case based on circumstantial evidence—they observed that labor-to-loans ratios were decreasing at 
lending banks, which is consistent with the substitution of hard information technology for soft 
information labor inputs.  Surprisingly, to date no study has either confirmed or refuted their conjecture.     
We make three important findings in this study.  First, using a small business loan database 
different from the one employed by Petersen and Rajan (2002), we corroborate their findings that: (i) 
borrower-lender distances were increasing during the 1980s and early 1990s; (ii) small businesses were   13
located quite close to their lenders, typically just a few miles away; and (iii) the rate at which average 
borrower-lender distances were increasing was slight, measuring only a fraction of a mile each year.  
Second, we demonstrate that the annual increases in small business borrower-lender distances have in 
recent years accelerated substantially beyond the distances reported by Petersen and Rajan.  Third, and 
most importantly, we provide direct evidence that links the largest and most recent increases in borrower-
lender distance to a specific, hard information-based innovation in information technology: small business 
credit scoring.  Our estimates indicate that the average borrower-lender distance between 1984 and 2001 
was nearly 36 miles longer for loans made by banks that used small business credit scoring techniques. 
Our results show that small business credit-scoring methods are a primary driver of increased 
borrower-lender distances in the U.S.  Our estimates also suggest that a non-trivial portion of increased 
borrower-lender distance is attributable to general (i.e., non-scoring) improvements in information 
technology: using two different regression specifications to capture these trends, we find that borrower-
lender distances have also accelerated (although not by as much) for non-scoring banks.  This finding 
both corroborates and extends the increases in borrower-lender distances documented by Petersen and 
Rajan (2002) during the pre-scoring era prior to 1993.  By separating the scoring and non-scoring drivers 
of distance, our results show that even the most traditional of lending models—that is, lending to opaque 
business borrowers based on soft information and bank-borrower relationships—are made more efficient 
by advances in information, communications, and other technologies.    
Consequently, our tests generate substantial evidence that phenomena other than information 
technology—such as cross-sectional differences in borrower, lender, and market characteristics—are 
important determinants of small business borrower-lender distances.  One of our more intriguing findings: 
larger government loan guarantees make lenders more willing to lend to especially information-poor 
borrowers (i.e., those applying for low-doc loans) at longer distances.  This result is consistent with 
lenders exploiting moral hazard incentives—a taxpayer shield from credit losses induces lenders to adopt 
riskier lending practices. 
    14
References 
 
Agarwal, Sumit, and Robert Hauswald, 2006, Distance and Information Asymmetries in Lending Decisions, 
Working paper, American University. 
 
Akhavein, Jalal, W. Scott Frame, and Lawrence J. White, 2005, The Diffusion of Financial Innovation: An 
Examination of the Adoption of Small Business Credit Scoring by Large Banking Organizations, 
Journal of Business 78(2), 577–96.  
 
Berger, Allen N., and Robert DeYoung, 2006, Technological Progress and the Geographic Expansion of 
Commercial Banks, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 38(6),1483-1513.   
 
Brevoort, Kenneth and Timothy H. Hannan. 2006. “Commercial Lending and Distance: Evidence from 
Community Reinvestment Act Data.” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 38(8), 1991-2012. 
 
Cole, Rebel A. and John D. Wolken. 1995. “Financial Services Used by Small Businesses: Evidence from the 
1993 National Survey of Small Business Finances,” Federal Reserve Bulletin, July, 659-667. 
 
DeYoung, Robert, Dennis Glennon, and Peter Nigro. 2008. “Borrower-Lender Distance, Credit Scoring, and 
the Performance of Small Business Loans.” Journal of Financial Intermediation, 17(1), 113-143. 
 
Frame, W. Scott, Aruna Srinivasan, and Lynn Woosley. 2001. “The Effect of Credit Scoring on Small 
Business Lending.” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 33(3), 813-825. 
 
Office of Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administration, Small Business Lending in the United States, 1999 
Edition.  
 
Petersen, Mitchell A., and Raghuram G. Rajan. 2002. “The Information Revolution and Small Business 
Lending: Does Distance Still Matter?” Journal of Finance, 57, 2533-2570.  
 
   15
Table 1 
Summary Statistics 
Variables used in the estimation of equations (1) and (2).  Data are a random sample of 31,880 Small 
Business Administration 7(a) loans originated by U.S. commercial banks between 1984 and 2001.  All 




Deviation Minimum  Maximum 
DISTANCE  63.6516 286.6681  0.1000  7882.6000 
lnDISTANCE  2.2000 1.9258  -2.3026  8.9724 
SCORER  0.1373 0.3441 0  1 
Preferred Lender Program  0.1283 0.3344 0  1 
Certified Lender Program  0.1629 0.3693 0  1 
BANK SIZE  $14,601,626.63 60,954,976.51 $1,055.93  $607,085,000
lnBANKSIZE  13.1973 2.4575  6.9622  20.2242 
BHC SIZE  $51,035,601 154,737,291 $1,6247  $1.26E+09 
lnBHCSIZE  13.9822 2.9064  7.301148  20.38828 
BRANCHES/ASSETS  0.0690 0.1761  0.0015  7.5759 
LOGBRANCHZIP  1.7116 0.884829 0  4.189655 
MBHC  0.5316 0.499007 0  1 
EQUITYRATIO  8.3816 2.9972  -5.59  76.83 
CILOANRATIO  0.1576 0.0910 0  0.741675 
CIPASTDUERATIO  2.2728 10.7817 0  1195.83 
HHI  0.1906 0.1150 0  1 
URBAN  0.8232 0.3815 0  1 
INCOMEGROWTH  1.2371 0.9171  -5.76254  8.182991 
BRANCHRESTRICT  0.8339 0.3722 0  1 
CORPORATION  0.5605 0.4963 0  1 
PARTNERSHIP  0.0735 0.2609 0  1 
FIRMSIZE*  12.5077 111.4224  1  9999 
lnFIRMSIZE  1.6533 1.1279 0  9.2102 
NEWFIRM  0.3268 0.4691 0  1 
Ag., Fishery, Forestry (SIC_A)  0.0321 0.1762 0  1 
Mining (SIC_B)  0.0034 0.0581 0  1 
Retail (SIC_G)  0.3321 0.4710 0  1 
LOANSIZE  $144,242 165,037  $2,000  $2,550,000 
lnLOANSIZE  11.4240 0.9505  7.600903  14.7516 
GUAR%  0.8003 0.1011  0.11  0.9 
LOWDOC  0.3108 0.4628 0  1 
MATURITY3  0.1376 0.3445 0  1 
MATURITY7  0.6455 0.4784 0  1 
 
* The SBA 7(a) loan program has a firm-size constraint of 500 employees.  However, the SBA can and 
does occasionally approve loans to firms that exceed this size threshold.  Of the 31,880 loans in our 
sample, 15 borrowing firms had more than 500 employees.   
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Table 2 
Borrower-Lender Distance Regressions 
Results from the ordinary least squares estimation of equations (1) and (2) for a random sample of 31,880 
Small Business Administration 7(a) loans originated by U.S. commercial banks between 1984 and 2001.  
The dependent variable lnDISTANCE is the natural log of borrower-lender distance.  SCORER is a 
dummy equal to one if the lending bank was affiliated with an organization in which the lead bank used 
credit scores to evaluate small business loan applications.  TIME1 is a linear time trend over the entire 
1984-2001 sample period.  TIME2 is a linear time trend over the post-credit scoring 1993-2001 portion of 
the sample period.  The YEAR variables are dummies indicating the year of loan origination (1984 is 
omitted).  All other variables are defined in the text.   
 
 
 (1)  (2) 










  Intercept  -0.9734  0.074 0.036  -1.3025  0.0228 0.0057 
  SCORER  0.8068  0.000 0.000  -0.3021  0.2543 0.055 
  TIME1       0.0336  0.0001 0.0001 
  TIME2       0.0240  0.0872 0.0371 
  TIME2*SCORER       0.0240  0.0001 0.0001 
  YEAR1985  -0.0096  0.928 0.929      
  YEAR1986  -0.1406  0.126 0.117       
  YEAR1987  0.0910  0.356 0.297      
  YEAR1988  0.0570  0.564 0.554      
  YEAR1989  0.0307  0.733 0.726      
  YEAR1990  0.0521  0.566 0.559      
  YEAR1991  0.2360  0.014 0.010      
  YEAR1992  0.1363  0.147 0.118       
  YEAR1993  0.1665  0.058 0.052      
  YEAR1994  0.2764  0.002 0.001      
  YEAR1995  0.2873  0.001 0.001      
  YEAR1996  0.4383  0.000 0.000      
  YEAR1997  0.4227  0.000 0.000      
  YEAR1998  0.5655  0.000 0.000       
  YEAR1999  0.5992  0.000 0.000      
  YEAR2000  0.7029  0.000 0.000      
  YEAR2001  0.8093  0.000 0.000      
Lender Characteristics:          
  Preferred Lender Program  0.3960  0.000 0.000 0.4284  0.0001 0.0001 
  Certified Lender Program  0.0542  0.169 0.202 0.0653  0.0960 0.1237 
  lnBHCSIZE  -0.0002  0.992 0.987  -0.0013  0.9566 0.9305 
  lnBANKSIZE  0.1594  0.000 0.000 0.1548  0.0002 0.0001 
  BRANCHES/ASSETS  -0.2143  0.332 0.264  -0.2346  0.3345 0.2539 
  MBHC  -0.0829  0.068 0.020  -0.0792  0.0789 0.0269 
  EQUITYRATIO  0.0193  0.019 0.001 0.0188  0.0191 0.0007 
  CILOANRATIO  0.4475  0.044 0.017 0.4784  0.0332 0.0082 
  CIPASTDUERATIO  0.0011  0.092 0.124 0.0010  0.0976 0.1316 
 
 
Table is continued on next page 
 





 (1)  (2) 










Borrower Characteristics:            
  CORPORATION  -0.0740  0.006 0.013  -0.0728  0.0066 0.0135 
  PARTNERSHIP  -0.0233  0.613 0.568  -0.0244  0.5948 0.5486 
  lnFIRMSIZE  -0.0395  0.004 0.005  -0.0373  0.0081 0.0094 
  NEWFIRM  0.0620  0.011 0.009 0.0637  0.0089 0.0063 
  Ag., Fish, Forest (SIC_A)  0.3316  0.000 0.000 0.3504  0.0001 0.0001 
  Mining (SIC_B)  0.1252  0.542 0.390 0.1526  0.4618 0.3054 
  Retail (SIC_G)  -0.0605  0.008 0.003  -0.0580  0.0129 0.0055 
Market Characteristics:            
  lnBRANCHZIP  -0.2532  0.000 0.000  -0.2523  0.0001 0.0001 
  HHI  -0.0026  0.991 0.992  -0.0073  0.9759 0.9766 
  URBAN  0.4771  0.000 0.000 0.4819  0.0001 0.0001 
  HHI*URBAN  0.0747  0.825 0.848 0.0805  0.8112 0.8355 
  INCOMEGROWTH  0.0220  0.079 0.078 0.0230  0.0615 0.0664 
  BRANCHRESTRICT  0.1140  0.039 0.065 0.1226  0.0224 0.0426 
Loan Characteristics:          
  lnLOANSIZE  0.1155  0.000 0.000 0.1228  0.0001 0.0001 
  GUAR%  -1.1677  0.003 0.001  -0.9614  0.021 0.0053 
  LOWDOC  -3.2305  0.000 0.000  -2.6973  0.0001 0.0001 
  GUAR%*LOWDOC  3.7599  0.000 0.000 3.1685  0.0001 0.0001 
  MATURITY3  -0.0704  0.400 0.304  -0.0739  0.3759 0.295 
  MATURITY7  0.0555  0.108 0.096 0.0551  0.1129 0.0978 
          
Adjusted R-square  0.2071     0.2105    
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 Figure 1 
This figure compares median annual borrower-lender distances constructed for small business loans from 
two different times and databases.  Petersen and Rajan (2002, Table I, page 2,537) constructed borrower-
lender distances for banking relationships that started in 1973 and continued through 2001, which are 
based on data from the 1993 National Survey of Small Business Finances (NSSBF).  We construct 
borrower-lender distances for Small Business Administration (SBA) loans originated between 1984 and 
2001.  The SBA loans are also reported separately after 1993 for banking organizations that did or did not 
use small business credit scoring, which are based on data from a Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta survey 
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